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Abstract 
One of the responses to the global policy thrust of 'integrated water management' has been 
the establishment of  catchment councils. Zimbabwe has not been an exception, and following 
the  water reforms of the  1990s,  a number of catchment councils were  created.  This  paper 
looks at the  functioning of the Save  Catchment Council,  and the institutional functioning of 
decentralised catchment management.  With  access to resources defined through the issuing 
of a  permit,  potentially  many more  water users  can  gain  access  to  water resources  for 
livelihoods than  under the previous policy regime.  However, what emerges from the study is 
that despite the neat design of  catchment approaches, their operation is very much based on 
who can negotiate most effectively.  In practice,  those who already have high levels of water 
access (in  Zimbabwe,  often larger-scale  commercial farmers)  are most likely to  benefit,  as 
they both  dominate  the  council  membership  and  are  more  effective  at articulating  their 
demands.  Different  conceptions  of rights  and  entitlement  to  resources  also  affect  how 
debates  within  catchment  councils  are  carried  out.  The  unequal  playing  field  of water 
resource  access  and  use,  and  the  politics  this  inequality  implies,  therefore  affect 
fundamentally the functioning of such new institutions,  which are ostensibly designed to  be 
participatory, inclusionary, and pro poor. 
Key Words: Water;  Decentralisation, Stakeholders, Policy Processes, Institutions,  Catchment 
Councils, Zimbabwe. 
Introduction 
Governance  of  water  resources  is  a  key  global  policy  theme.  Since  the  late  1990s, 
mainstreaming the concept of governance in water management has been led by the Global 
Water  Partnership.  The  Framework  for Action  (FFA)  document  began  this  process  by 
promoting  a  concept  of  integrated  water  resources  management  that  'promotes  the 
coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to 
maximise  the  resultant  economic  and  'sodal  welfare  in  an  equitable  manner  without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems' (GWP 2000: 22).  This approach sought 
to  accelerate  the  devolution  of  responsibilities  to  water  users  and  build  transparent  and 
accountable  mechanisms  for  resource  allocations  (GWP  2000:  30).  Many  southern  Africa 
countries including  South_ Africa,  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe have  had  such  an  approach 
and  bundle of ideas embedded within new policy structures and  national plans in tne sector. 
Regional  networks such  as  the  GWP  regional  TechniGal  Advisory Committee  and  bilateral 
donors  are  also  active  in  the  uptake  and  dissemination  of  ideas  of water  governance 
embedded  in  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management (IWRM).  Some  donors  within  the 
region  have  also  led  the  uptake  of these  ideas.  including  German  Technical  Cooperation 
(GTZ).  which  established  an  internCitional  IWRM  Network  that  acted  as  an  'incentive  fOF 
government  and  institutions  to  optimi,se  water  resources  management'.  Piloting  began  in 
1  This paper is  an  abridged  wriion  of a fill/paper of lhe  sOJm  title  and siems jrom  Ihe  re.rearrh  condl/cled  Il11der  the  Sustainable 
Livelihoods in Southern Mrica: Institutiolls.,  Governance and Policy Processes Project fom 2001  m2002,  and 
onJ!jling PhD  re.rearrh  in  Zimbabwe.  The  rrie4f);h  was junded f!J  Ihe  UK DffJarl!!,enl for International Devekipmenl's Rnral Liw/ihOods 
Departmenl Po/iq Research Progfa!!711g.  Tbe tiews expressed in Ibis arlickdo nol necessarilY reflect Ihose ofIhefonder or col/abo!atingpa~11ers_ 
1­. southern  Africa  becaus~ of  a  perceiv~d 'broad  acceptance'  by  regional  actors~ of  IWRM 
concepts.' 
.The emphasis onreordering the governance of water in the  region  is notsurprising. Au:three 
key countries in the SLSA sfudy have tmdeJgone rapid political change since the early 1990s. 
New  political  systems that are  more  inclusive and  ostensibly representative  have triggered 
demands for greater-access to n§ltural-resOtJrces.  In  many ways the new policy framework~ 
reflect  this  situation.  But  it  ISirl1portant  to.- ask  whether  the  policy  frameworks  and ~their 
institutional vehicles, in  practice~allow a  n~w,  more inclusive system of resources governance 
fo  take  place?  Key questions addr-essed  in  this study  include:  How  is  policy developing  at 
national,  SUb-national  and  local  levels?  How  are  local  narratives  on  resources  acc~ss 
reflected  in  institutional structures? Whtcb~forms of participation are emerging and  whafare 
the  formal  and  informal rules  and  'events'- governing access?  What are  the  new structures 
and access by the poor to the resource? And how does IWRM 'fit' with wider decentralisation 
processes  underway~ This study was conducted in Zimbabwe in the  period 2000 to 2001.  It 
focuses chiefly on the experience of water resource governance in one main river basin, the 
Save. 
Zimbabwe's Water Resources 
Water in Zimbabwe is  becoming increasingly scarce largely due to the growing demands for 
domestic,  agriculture, and  industrial  water needs (Chenje  at al.  1998). This has  also been 
compounded  by rapid  population  increase. Surface water resources  contribute over 90%  to 
the  country's  water  supply,  of which  rivers  provide  the  largest  proportion.  However,  river 
flows  are  annually  and  inter-annually  variable  due  to  rainfall  variations.  Surface  water 
resources  are  supplemented  by the building of dams.  In  1998, there were 140 dams with a 
greater capacity of one million cubic metres,  and  10,747 smaller ones providing more  than 
five  billion ·cubic metres of impounded water capacity (Chimowa and  Nuget undated). Use of 
water  varies  from  one' dam  to  another,  but  it  generally  includes  irrigation, 
commercial/industrial, domestic supply, power generation, and recreation. 
History of  Water Management in Zimbabwe 
The origins of institutional access to water in Zimbabwe are found  in the political economy of 
the  settler-colony.  From  the  1920s  up  to  1998,  there  existed  a  legal  and  administrative 
framework that governed the access to,  and ownership, control and  use of water in favour of 
sectional  interests-namely commercial  farming,  and  mining and  manufacturing industries. 
The  various  pieces of colonial  legislation,  culminating  in  the  1976  Water Act saw Africans 
being legally denied access to,  and  use of,  water for secondary purposes, such as irrigation. 
Some of the basic principles enshrined in the Water Act (1976) are: 
• 	 All water, other than private water, is vested in the State and its use apart from  primary 
purposes requires that a water right be granted to the user by the Water Court. 
• 	 During periods when there is insufficient water, the available water is distributed on  the 
basis  that  water right  holders who  were  allocated  water earlier have  to  satisfy their 
needs first, before late water right holders can  exercise their rights (priority is  based on 
date of application for a water right), the 'first in right, first in time' principle. 
• 	 Water rights are granted in  perpetuity and are attached  to  land. Thus, only individuals 
or persons with title deeds to land could apply for, and be granted, water rights. 
The Water Act (1976) allowed owners, lessees, or occupiers of any land to construct wells or 
drill  boreholes  on  the  land.  The  amount  of ground  water  abstracted  was  not  controlled. 
However,  the minister was empowered to  declare groundwater control  areas,  in  which  case 
deepening  or  drilling  boreholes  with  a  depth  greater  than  15  metres  required  ministerial 
permission. 
The  administration  of  the  Act  was  the  responsibility  of  the  Water  Court,  which  was 
empowered  to investigate the  use  of water granted  in  a right.  and  revise  or cancel a water 
2 being  connected  to  Southern  Africa.  This  was  a  major step  towards  improving  trade  and 
commerce with the outside world. 
But being one of four projects that were intended to meet the primary goal of opening up the 
landlocked  interior,  this  was  a  modest  achievement.  The  railways  project,  in  which  two 
branch lines would connect Rwanda and  Burundi to the  East African Community (EAC) grid 
through the  port of Bukoba;  the  roads  rehabilitation  programme;  and  the  navigability of the 
Kagera never got beyond the feasibility study stage. 
The KBD regional centre for economic documentation: The centre was set up in Kigali as 
part  of  the  Human  Resources  Development  project  portfolio.  Funded  by  the  UN~, it 
boasted
2 of a collection  of over 8,000  items that included  reference  books,  periodicals and 
project study  reports  and  documents;  and  a modern  Statistical  Data  Bank and  Information 
Service. It was to serve the purpose of acquiring, storing and disseminating information to the 
KBO  Secretariat, specialists and  consultants participating in  the organisation's activities and 
other relevant bodies in the member States. 
The Kagera  Polytechnic Institute, which was the other project in this portfolio. was shelved in 

part due to its intended beneficiaries preferring to study abroad. 

The tsetsefly and trypanosomiasis control project: This was one of six projects under the 
Agriculture  Sector.  Under this  project,  the  Economic Commission  for  Africa's  International 
Centre of Insect Physiology and  Ecology ECNICIPE conducted  vector distribution  surveys 
and  trials  on  various  control  methodologies  in  the  heavily  infested  (former)  Akagera  Park 
region.  It is  on  the  basis  of this that the full-scale  control  programme was to be  launched. 
This, however, was not implemented due to funding constraints. 
The  Rusomo  Hydroelectric project,  which  at the  organisation's inception  was conceived  as 
the  key to  industrial activity in'the basin areas of Burundi, Rwanda and  Tanzania ended  up 
being the subject of several inconclusive studies. Thus, in terms of implementing the Priority 
Action  Programme, the KBO  clearly under performed. Indeed viewed  in financial terms, only 
US  $18.75 million3 of the budgeted US $3 billion capital cost of the PAP was mobilised. This 
represents  a huge  investment gap  and,a failure  to  capture the  interest of potential funding 
agencies.  Also,  considering  that  member  contributions  averaged  about  30%  of  funding 
requirements,  it could  be that its architects overestimated the members' financial capacity to 
meet regime costs or that the riparian states lacked faith in the organisation. 
Adaptive capacity: an alternative evaluation criteria 
As  Rangley  et al (1994) concluded, the organisation's overextended mandate and  a lack of 
clear objectives were  key  factors that  influenced  its  performance,  but going  by Waterbury's 
(2002)  argument,  extending  the  agenda  to  include  non-water related  sectors  presented  an 
opportunity  for  increased  trade-offs  between the  riparians  which  was  not exploited.  Which 
brings  into  question  the  role  social  resources,  or  their  lack  of,  played  in  the  KBO's 
performance. 
The  social resources referred to in this context can be defined as the ability of administrative 
organs and  managers responsible for natural resources utilisation to deploy the  appropriate 
development, reform and  adaptation mechanisms for management organisations to function: 
in  essence  Adaptive  Capacity (see  Homer-Dixon,  2000,  1994; Ohlsson,  1999; Serengeldin, 
Aster,  1994;  Turton,  2002;  Turton,  1999, 2000).  Social  resources  determine the  openness 
and flexibility of an institution thus defining the progressiveness of an institution in the face of  ... 
2 Almost all ofits collection of equipment and materials were looted in the 1994 civil war in Rwanda. 

3 Excluding the cost ofconstructing the Headquarlers and regional offices buildings. 

3 emerging  problems.  They  form  the  required  foundation  upon  which  policy  options  and  or 
strategies  can  subsequently  be  built.  A  sound  principle  is  that  for  the  development  of a 
functional  institutional framework,  a level  of social  resources  corresponding to  the  required 
level  of adaptation to the  increasing complexities of natural resources development must be 
achieved  and  maintained. A failure  to  meet and  sustain  this  level would  mean  the failure  of 
the institution. 
Continuing with  the construction analogy, we find that the pillars of institutional development 
are technical ingenuity on the one hand and social ingenuity on the other. 
Technical ingenuity deals with the creation of the capacity to manipulate the environment in 
order to develop and  utilise natural resources.  In institutional design, this forms the structural 
component  whose  construction  parts  are  the  technical  and  financial  aspects  of  the 
institutional  arrangements.  It  lays  out  the  procedural  rules;  the  actors;  the  mechanisms for 
creating  capacity  in  data  generation,  capture,  processing  and  sharing;  and  the  intellectual 
capital needed  to  interpret the  data  in  order to generate and  implement viable strategies or 
policy options. This is a well-covered subject in institutional literature upon which we will  not 
dwell  much  (see  Bromley,  2000;  Carlsson,  2001;  North,  1990;  Young,  1989,  1980; Young, 
Osherenko, 1993). 
Social ingenuity as an  aspect of management institutional development is  o~en mentioned 
in  passing,  but  has  not  been  explored  in  depth  as  a  critical  success  factor  in  regime 
formation.  It constitutes the  social element of regime  formation  that determines the  level  of 
success that can be achieved when creating an enabling environment for: 
• 	 Inspiring commitment to the institutional arrangements among stakeholders; 
• 	 The  regime  to  generate strategies or policy options that are  perceived  as  being both 
reasonable and legitimate by the stakeholders; and 
• 	 The  institutional organs to develop adaptive mechanisms with which  to ensure that the 
regime  is not held hostage by  'high-politics' especially if the  latter is  characterised by 
tense relations between riparians. 
Perceptions are therefore very important especially among sovereign States whose interests 
are dynamic. It is for the purpose of understanding these perceptions and, where appropriate, 
changing  them  or  instituting  reforms  to  adapt  to  them  that  makes  social  ingenuity  an 
indispensable element of regime formation. 
Obviously, these two pillars, technical and  socia! ingenuity, cannot be developed in  isolation 
from  one  another.  Yet  in  the  case  of the  KBO,  all  the  activities  leading  up  to the Rusomo 
Treaty focussed entirely on the technical aspects of the regime with no attempt whatsoever to 
explore the social resources that would legitimise the regime for its intended actions and thus 
garner  member  commitment  and,  more  importantly,  eliminate  the  donor  skepticism  that 
undermined  its existence.  In  developing countries,  exogenous support from  such  actors  as 
aid donors,  specialised  agencies and  financial institutions plays a central role in institutional 
development.  Similarly for the KBO,  the  UNDP and  the Kingdom  of Belgium  played such  a 
central  role  in  the  activities  to  justify  the  KBO's  formation  and  its  design  that  even  the 
Rusomo  treaty  was  based  on  a  draft  prepared  by  two  UNDP  consultants
4
,  Under  such 
circumstances,  the  social  component was required  to  develop a mechanism to adapt these 
arrangements  to  the  historical.  cultural  and  political  conditions  that  existed  among  the 
riparians,  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  negotiating  dynamics  leading  to  successful 
establishment of water management accords vary  from  basin  to  basin and  as  such there is 
no  global applicability (Cano,  1986;  Marty,  2001;  Mitchell,  1990). which  is  why there was a 
need  for feedback to take place between the technical and  social components of the KBO's 
establishment. 





utilisation  a-odcon.servatiOn  of the -country's  water resources  1hwu§h a  coordinated 
approach.  _  __ 
• 	 Water  would  ,be  moo?ged  by  catchment  areas.  Catchment  and  SUb-Catchment 
COtJncil~ woald  be sef up for all  river l'!ystems  and  aquifers,  and  WOlltd  be  basea  on 
sLib-hydrological  zotie~  They  melude  representatives  from  communal,~small...sca!e 
commElfcial-and  large-scale commercial farms,  mines,as well  as" rep[eseotatives  -from 
industry; lllaouiacJurTng and  local  authoritiesl municipalities. These wOIJ.ld  rBptace-th'e 
River Boards and the AdviSory Councils and be responsible for granting  ~water permits. 
Institutions of Water Management and the Creation of ZINWA 
The water s-ector was prevloJJsly characterised by a multiplicity of institutions with dIVerse and 
divergent  interests.- In  addition  the  various' players  operated  from  different. ministries  and 
departments: 
• 	 Central  government  institutions such 'as  the  Ministry of Rural  Resources  and  Water 
Development through the Department of Water Developmenf 
• 	 Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing through the National 
Action  Committee for the  Integrated  Rural  Water Supply and  Sanitation  Programme; 
Minisfry of Agriculture, Lands and Resettlement through the Department of Agricultural, 
Technical  and  Extension  Services  (AGRITEX);  Ministry of Health  and  Child  Welfare; 
Ministry  of  Environment  and  Tourism;  Ministry  of Finance;  the  National  Economic 
Planning Commission. 
• 	 Quasi  governmentlparastatal  organisations  such  as  the  Agriculture  and  Rural 
Development Authority (ARDAj, the Regional Water Authority,. the District Development 
Fund and Agriculture Finance Corporation (now Agribank). 
• 	 Local  government institutions such  as, Urban  and Rural  District Councils that have  a 
major role in terms of supplying 'Water to their residents. 
• 	 Stakeholder institutions, which'include Cl3tchment Councils. 
• 	 Research organisations such  as  the  University of Zimbabwe and the  Institute of Water 
and Sanitation Development (IWSD). 
The  existence  of  many  institutions  dealing  with  water  posed  problems.  For  instance, 
operational  policies  differed  from  one  organisation  to  another.  These institutions existed  in 
line  ministries  that  were  vertically  integrated  and  did  not  have  horizontal  integration. 
, Duplication of activities was widespread leading to inefficiency of the water sector as a whole. 
The institutional set up was restructured to take into account the fact that government was no 
longer  able  to  sustain  the  operations  of the  many  institutions  in  the  water  sectors.  The 
institutional restructuring exercise resulted in  the transformation of the Department of Water 
Development into a statutory body, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), which 
was tasked with several objectives: 
• 	 To improve institutional coordination in the water sector, recognising the existence of a 
multiplicity of institutions involved in water governance. 
• 	 To address Government's failure  to  sustain  the operations of the many institutions in 
the water sector. 
• 	 To deal with  the need for the sector to  move towards self-sufficiency through internal 
revenue  generation,  thereby  reducing  its  dependence  on  direct  allocations  from 
government.  In  this  context.  the  major task  of ZINWA was  to  provide  bulk  raw  and 
treated  water to  water users.  In  doing  this  it  had  to  operate  along  commercial  line~, 
generating its own resources for operations and maintenance of infrastructure. 
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~unctiOrfsof ZIN.W~- . 
ZINWA has functiof.ls at  d~ffereAt levels: 
• 	 To a9vise the-Minister on  Jhe formulation  of national policies aod standards on  waJer 
!esourcespianning, maQagement and  developm~nt, dam safety and_-boreh01e i:lrilling, 
and water priCirtg.  - ­
• 	 To assist ani:!  participate in  or advise on  any -matter pertaining to the planritng of the 
de_velopment, exploitation, protection and conservation of water reSOUfces.  -­
• 	 To  promot~ a-n  equitable, -efficient and  sustainable allocation  an=(j  distributio-n -of  water 
resotJrces  ­
.-	 To enCDlJrage  and assist local authorities in  the discharge of theif functions.under the 
Rural  District~ouncils Act and Urban Councils Act, with regard to thadevelopment and 
management ot  water--resources  in  areas under their jorisdiction and  in -particular the 
provision of potable water and the disposal of waste water  ­
• 	 To Provide technical assistance and advice to the Catchment Councils 
Catchment Councils 
The  Water Act  of 1998  specifies  the  establishment  of Catchment Councils.  About  seven 
Catchm_ent  Councils  are  being  established  in  the  major hydrological zones  of the  country. 
These counCils are expected to oversee Sub-catchment Councils, and ~water user groups in 
their areas of jurisdiction. Sub-Catchment areas are based on sub-hydrological zone and  on 
Intensive  Conservation  Area  (ICAs).  Catchment 'c0u'ncils'  functions  included preparing  an 
outline  plan  for  their  river  systems,  determining' applications  and  granting  water permits, 
regulating  and  supervising  the  use  of water,  supervising  the  performance  of functions  by 
Sub-catchment Councils, ana dealing with confliGts over water. 
Sub-catchment Councils' functions include: 
• 	 'Regulating  and  supervising  the exercise  of permits  for  the  use  of  water  including 
ground water within the area f6(which may established 
• 	 Reporting as required to the Catchment Councils on exercise of water permits within its 
areas 
• 	 Monitoring water flows  and  water use in  accordance with  the  allocations made under 
the permits 
• 	 Assisti,ng in the collection of data and participating in planning 
• 	 Collecting sub-catchments rates, fees and levies 
Catchment councils were established  by  an  Act of Parliament as institutions that would  be 
responsible for the management of water in  a specified catchment. The logic for the creation 
and  formation  of catchment council is based  on the river system of a particular area  and is 
closely tied  to the idea that basin-level integrated water resources management is the  most 
efficient way of governing the  resource. Thus an area with its own  river system feeding,  but 
not necessarily, into the major river of a particular area would form a catchment. For instance 
the rivers directly and indirectly flowing into Save River, would form Save Catchment. 
To this  extent,  seven  major rivers  in  Zimbabwe constituted  the  seven catchments,  namely 
Gwayi,  Manyame, Mazowe, Runde, Sanyati and Save. Below the catchment, there are sub­
catchments comprising a collection of the rivers that form the catchment of an area within the 
major catchment. For instance, for Save Catchment, there are rivers that form sUb-catchment 
of Save, namely, Budzi, Devure, Lower Save, Macheke, Upper Save, Odzi and  Pungwe (see 
Map 1 below). The  boundaries of sUb-catchment and  catchment areas span  administrative 
boundaries, and this has implications for water management. Catchment areas are managed 
by  chairpersons  and  vice-chairpersons  of  the  sUb-catchment  areas  that  comprise  a 
catchment area.  Chairpersons  and  vice-chairpersons of a sub-catchment area  constitute  a 
catchment council. 
6 - .. 
Sub-caJchme_nf areas care  managed  by  m~resentatives from  commercialfarming,_~mml,mal 
farming, sm<3l1-scale farming,-Rur:al.Oi$trict Councils (ROCs), traditional leaders, iooustry, a_nd 
both  old  and  new  resettlE~ment schemes.  These  different  stakehold.ers- constltute-_a Sub-
Catchment CQ1iflGJI:  _ 
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The Save Catchme,nt Council was ~stablisl)e9 in  1999, and is characterized by a diversity of 
water uses and users (Manzungu 2001), The "catchment area covers parts of three provinces 
in  Zimbabwe,  namely  Manicaland,  Mashonaland  East  and  Masvingo.  There  are  seven 
subcatchments  that  constitute  Save  Catchment  which  are  Budzi,  Oevure,  Lower  Save, 
Macheke, Upper Save. Odzi and Pungwe (See Map 2 below), 
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Background to Case Study Area 
Chipinge  district is  located  in  the 'extreme  south  of Manicaland  Province.lt  borders  with 
Mozambique to the east and south, Chimanimani district to the North and Masvingo Province 
to the west. The district'covers an  area approximately 5,393 square kilometres (km2) with a 
total  population of approximately 420,000 and a population density of just under 80  people 
per km2  in 2000. According  to-th~ 1992 Census, the district had a population density of  just 
over 60  people  per  km2,  suggesting  sabitantial recent in-migration.  Increasedpopulafion 
growth  has strained  the  capacity of the district,  particularly in  communal areas,  to  expand 
food production, which has been exacerbated by frequently occurring droughts, 
Economic Activity 
Agriculture dominates the economic activity of the district. The main crops grown are tea (on 
Tanganda Tea  Estates ~dotted around the district), coffee, tobacco, maize, macadamia nuts, 
sugarcane, wheat, catton,  beans,~  and t0matoes (mainly on  irrigation schemes in Region  5)'. 
There  is  also timber production,  pig  Bnd  sheep-rearing,  and  dairy  (Region1),  lrrigation~  ~ 
schemes have boosted agricultural activity of the district. There are more than nineirrTgation 
schemes in Chipinge.  rn  adelitien to-communal irrigation schemes, ~RDAhasiaige  irrigation 
schemes ~at~ Middle-Salle  ~nd Chisu~mbanje, which  mainly grow cotton.1Iiheat:c-and ~maize~~ 
There are plans to develop sugar caJ"le  production in the lowveld of  Chipinge:-To~thiselld. _ 
30,000  ha  of land havebeen-"9armarked  for  fast  track  resettlement  andaJready 6.00() ~ 
hectares  in  Miadle  ~ave have  been  planned  and demarcation  or pegging  nasstarted. To­
complementtQe  agricUl(urnJ  @IctiYity,  there~exists a  small  manl!facturlng  induStriit-- sector 
8 mainly involved in  beer,  milk processing, and  confectionery.  mportant to  note  is  the  fact the 
lowveld  part,  Region  4 and  5,  of Chipinge District are found  in  Lower Save  Sub-Ca~hment 
while the  high  0  medium rainfall part,  Region  1 to  3 of Chipinge district are located in  Budzi 
Sub-Catchment  Council.  Thus  irrigation  of crops  is  the  major agricultural  activity  found  in 
Lower Save sUb-catchment among White commercial and indigenous small-scale farmers. 
Budzi and Lower Save Sub-Catchments 
Budzi and  Lower Save two  of the seven Sub-Catchment Councils which constitute the Save 
Catchment  Council.  Budzi  SCC  spans  two  Rural  District  Councils,  Chimanimani  and 
Chipinge,  while  Lower  Save  SCC  covers  4  rural  districts  namely  Chipinge,  Chimanimani, 
Bikita,  and  Buhera.  One  of the  major objectives of the  Sub-Catchment Council  is  to  bring 
together all  stakeholders to  manage water in  a fair and just manner, affording every person 
equal access to water within a conservation framework. 
In the past, water was accessible to the commercial sector, both agriculture and industry. The 
large  commercial  farming  sector's  water  needs  in  the  two  Sub-Catchment  Councils  were 
represented  by  River  Boards,  while  industry  and  urban  residents  were  and  are  still 
represented by the water department of the Rural District Council. Small-scale irrigators were 
partially  'represented'  by  AGRITEX  and  subsistence  communal  farmers  were  not 
represented.  The  Sub-Catchment  Councils  replaced  the  river  boards,  which  previously 
supervised  the  day-to-day  management  of water.  River  boards  were  based  on  the  sub­
hydrological  zone  and  on  Intensive  Conservation  Area  (ICAs).  The  institution  of  Sub­
Catchment Councils sought to  reverse  sectoral involvement and  management of water and 
put  in  place  a broad  based  management concept that suited  the  new  socio-political order. 
This new resource governance concept incorporated, among other things, decentralised and 
democratised management institutions and theprinciple of stakeholder participation. The idea 
was to  have  a more  inclusiye institutional structure  with representation  across the range  of 
water users or stakeholders. 
For both Budzi and Lower Save Sub-Catchment Councils, the following key water users were 
identified:  commercial  farmers,  communal 'farmers,  small-scale farmers,. traditional  leaders, 
private  companies,  resettled  farmers  and  irrigators.  Rural  district  councils  that  are  found 
within  the  sub-catchment,  and:  government departments  - mainly  AG RlTEX  and  Natural 
Resources  - and  representatives  from  ZINWA  also  became  mmbers,  through  invitation. 
Further, with  regard  to Lower Save sub- catchment, the commercialised government estates 
that are under the Agricultural. Rural Development Authority (ARDA) constitute a key member 
in the use and management of water in the SUb-Catchment Council. 
-' 
While  the  stakeholders  mentioned  above  illustrate  the  broad  composition  of the  two  sub­
catchments,  there  are  important  sub-catchment  issues  worth  mentioning.  Eor  Lower  Save 
sub-catchment,  dam water is  the dominant source of water and  irrigated  agriculture is  the 
major agricultural activity. Thus, irrigators and related agricultural issues dominate the Lower 
Save Sub-Catchment Council. Admil1istratiyely, 'stakeholders deal more direqtly with  Z./I\lWA 
than  the  Sub-Catchment Council  precisely (iue  to the  fact that dams  ~re under the  direct 
management and c,?ntrol of ZINyvA, and'not the Sub-Catohment Council. On  th~ hand, rivers 
are the main SQurces of water in  Budzi subcatchment and commercial farming dominates the 
agricultural  activities  in .the  sub~c"atchment. Consequently,  commerci~1 farmers.  and  their 
related concernsdomina"te the Budzi SUb-Catchment Council. Due tothe domlnance-of rivers 
in  Budzt  sUb-catchllJent, staKel}o1ders  deal  more  with  Sub-Catghment C!'furicil  toori ~witb 
ZINWA.  S_et  ag~in~r [his ~backdrop, it  is -important  to  analyse  the -narratives_-.that  different 
stakeholders  uSe  in  oraer to.gain- access  to  and  use  of water in {he two SUb-oCatchment 
Councils.  While  it IS apparent  th~t each  group  of water users  has  its own _uniql!ehisf0"ry~ 
concepfualisation~iinterests and  means  of  access  to  water,  it  is  impor;tant  to  put  into 
9 -

perspective  and  -undersI~lRd.water dynamics  that  occur  at  Budzi  and  Lower  Save  Sl:lb~ 
Catchment Councils. 
InstitutLonal Access to W~ter  Among Users 
~  -
From the 1920s up to 1998, there existed a legal and administrative framework that governed 
the  access  to,  arid -gwoersflip,  control,  and  use  of water  in  favour  of seClional· iDterests  ~ 
namely  commercial  farmjng,  and  mining  and  manufacturing  industries.  Co:rtHl1Unal_. people 
were legally denfed  ~ccess ti;:faM_use ef,water for secondary pu(posej,such asiiTig<3.t[on~ 
Colonial tegislation, cu1minating in the 1976 Water Act, provided legal clothing  tQ indirect arfd 
direct denial qf the rightef"'Africans to access water. The indirect denial was  charact~rlsed by 
the tying together of land and water rights. This is evident in the  1976 Water Act, which gave 
riparian rights to landowners. Thus, ""Only individuals or persons with title dee(js to lanatould 
apply for,  and  be  granted water ri"ghts.  Since  cemmunal  people did  not have title deeds to 
land  it was  thus  impossible for them to  have water rights.  Direct denial of access to  water 
was  evident  in  the  colonial  government's  concerted  effort  at  establishing  I~gislation  that 
alienated Africans from fertile land, close to water sources, and their physical resettlement on 
Native  Reserves.  Native  Reserves,  later  called  communal  areas,  where  Africans  were 
resettled often had poorwater sources and low and erratic rainfall. 
Since communal f<;lrmers  did  not have water rights;- on  the basis  that they did not have land 
rights, they were viewed as having no stake and -interest in water management issues by the 
colonial  administration.  This  fact  was  starkly  expressed  in  colonial  legislation  on  both  land 
and water, which  legally denied communal farmers access to  mod~rn institutions involved in . 
water management.  In  addition,  communal. farmers were a disjointed  group with  no  formal 
org~misation to  represent their inteTests  in  water management. They were  denied access to 
the River Boards because they had  no water rights. Membership of river boards was  based 
on  both  land  arid water rights.  This situation existed for more than  one  and  a half decades 
after independence. 
Although communal farmers  were  denied access to water through  modern institutions, they 
had  their  own  traditional  institutions  that  governed  access  to  and  use  of water.  These 
traditional  institutions  were- and  still  are-based  on  'traditional  or  cultural  narratives'. 
Traditional'institutions, namely family and traditional leadership, are the central institutions in 
. 'traditional or cultural narratives' used in gaining access to and use of water. 
On  the  premise  that water is  'God-given'  and  belongs  to  ancestral  spirits  and  thus  to  the 
community,  there are  no  formal  institutional  routes used in  gaining  access to  water.  Water 
belongs  to  everyone and  can  be  used  for domestic and  agricultural  purposes.  Agricultural 
purposes  include  irrigating  small  gardens  and  fields.  However,  in  accessing  water  for 
domestic  purposes  there  are  rules  that  are  informally  agreed  upon  governing  access  to 
water.  These  informal rules  are  largely based  on  the  sacred  nature  of water.  With  specific 
reference to natural springs these rules include, inter alia: 
•  People are not allowed to wash and/or bathe at the water source 
•  No livestock is allowed to drink at the water source 
•  No building using cement 
•  No putting in metal or plastic pipes 
•  In some cases no use of modern utensils, such as a metal bowls in fetching water 
•  No improper behaviour, including sexual activity, at or near or the natural spring. 
Breaching  of any of the  aforementioned  traditional  rules  would  cause  the  ancestral spirits, 
which  manifest themselves  in  snakes  or bees,  to  chase  the  offender.  The  chasing  of the 
offender normally occurs if the crime is a minor one, like bathing at the spring. In the event of 
using modern materials at the spring, it is stated that the natural spring will dry up.  In  addition 
to these traditional rules,  there are guidelines that govern the proper operation of the natural 
10 spring. Jt was_ st.<3ted  that, il']  order for tha-~pring to  continual p-rovide  wafer throygh outAhe 
year,  the  cllief,  the  ~hea~man,_  -anct  the  community  should  conduct -annual- traditional 
" ceremonies  to -appease  ·tbeancestral  spirit  of the  land.  The  water-or  natural  spring 
appeasement .c~remoniescan be-held-togeJher with  the  rainmaking  c~rem-bny. Faifure-tet 
carrY out  such--illlCesttar:appeasemencc~r.emonies would normally resultln misfortune  ...  su_ch 
as  drough~o()r  the  disappean:ince of people.  When  asked  abouL the  latter  case.·the 
responGlentsstated L  "  ."" 
people  normally diSappear at  fL~tural _springs  or at  rivers,  those.  wbo  Will  witn§lss  the 
disappearance  will  teJl  YOI1-J/Jat  they-had  seen  njuzu  (mermaid;:"'ln  the  event  ot"iuch 
disappearance~- the p_eoQle-:will not"  maum.  However,  the  Chief or a  trac!J1iof]al  heater,-Wilf 
conduct some rituals  begging forgiveness from  the traditional waler spirits.  IfthiJ ancestral 
spirits forgive, the. person wilLbe10und ang he or she will become a traditional heater:-z-
In  short, access to- water through tradjtional instltutions and  the  associated narratives  ... gives 
water a transcendental quality that links  th~ livelihoods and  religious  aspects  of communal 
people In  the- two  $ub-catchme_nt  area~.  G'iven  this  background,  colonial  legislation  and 
resultant  institutions  limited  access  to  water  by  Africans  (both  communal  and  small-sca-Ie 
farmers).  This  limitation  was  compounded  by  the  establishment  of  modern  institutions 
governing access to-and use of water. Further, the introduction of modem institutional routes 
to water was a new phenomenon for both small-scale and communal farmers. 
,­
Small-Scale Farl1Jer~ 
Historically,  small-scale  farl]'lers  hact  access  to  Native  Purchase  Land  and  thus  had title 
deeds to their-land. Title deeds to land made it possible for small-scale farmers to have water 
rights.  Despite the  fact that  small.:-.scale  fariners had  water  and  land  rights,  they  were  not 
represented on  the River Boards. WI-lile there was an effort to introduce small-scale farmers 
to 'modern agricultur!3' that is,  'to be, made  jlJ$~.like White commercial farmers' there was no 
effort to  include  them  ~m the  River  Boards,  just like  White  commercial  farmers.  This  fact 
notwithstanding,  small-scale  farmers  could  access the  River  Boards  when  applying  for  a 
water right.  What emerged from the case study was that there are two types of small-scale 
farmers.  One group, 'makorwa', was  converted  to  Christianity and  is found  in  Chinyaduma, 
Mount Selinda Mission Farm and Gwenzi areas.This group denounced the traditional system 
of worship,. traditional narratives and  associated  institutional routes  to water.  Yet, they had 
limited access to the modern institution surrounding access to and governance of water. This 
,was  the  case  despite  the  fact that they had  adopted  modern  agricultural  methods and  its 
associated narratives. In  short, their institutional route  to water,  both  modern and traditional, 
was IimiJed for two main reasons. Firstly, they had rejected the traditional conceptual thinking 
of water so traditional routes were closed for them. 
Secondly,  modern  institutions were  limited  because they were denied formal  representation 
on  River Boards, The second group was composed of small-scale farmers who bought land 
in  Native  Purchase Areas  and  who  were  not necessarily converted  Christians. This  group 
acknowledged and  accepted traditional  narratives surrounding access to  and  use  of water, 
and  thus  could  use  traditional  institutional  routes.  In  addition,  they  acknowledged  and 
accepted the  existence of the River Board  and Administrative Court,  and  similarly used this 
institutional  route  in  gaining  access  to  water.  These  small-scale  farmers  used  different 
institutional routes depending on their perception of their situation  and  which  route would be 
in  their best interest. A farmer  in  this  group  would  use  the  traditional  route  and  narratives 
when the farmer perceived that the  situation demanded the  traditional viewpoint and that he 
or she  would  benefit by using  traditional  institutional  route.  By  the  same  token,  the  farmer 
would  navigate  modern  institutions  if he  or she  perceived  there  to  be  benefits that  would 
accrue from that route. 
2 Interview JIll/I; a traditionalleader in ChillJanilltani 2/04/2002. 
11 War Veterans 
War veterans and the newly-resettled farmers are a new and emerging group of water users, 
and have no history of institutional access to water. They have to  be calculating, enterprising 
and innovative in finding institutional routes to water. This largely emanates from the fact that 
the emotive  and  politically-charged  debates  about  land.  land  redistribution,  and  associated 
narratives of access to land were not extended to water. While there is  an  elaborate array of 
political  institutions  governing  access  to  land,  from  the  farm  level  (for example.  the  base 
commanders and  seven  member committees)  to  the  district level  (for example,  the  district 
land committee) (Chaumba. Scoones and Wolmer 2003), there apparently are not any similar 
structures  governing  access  to  water.  Thus  there  is  a  tendency by  the  war  veterans  and 
newly-resettled  farmers  to  use  some  of  the  institutions  that  play  a  central  role  in  land 
allocation in applying for water permits. 
Commercial Farmers/Private Companies/ROC 
Commercial  farmers  and  private  companies  have  a  history of institutional access to  water, 
based  on  the  historical  link between land  and  water rights.  Individuals or persons with  title 
deeds  to  land,  were  granted  water rights.  These  individuals  and  persons  with  water  rights"\ 
could  form  a  River  Board,  which  would  be  tasked  with  the  day  to  day  running  and 
management of water in  a catchment area.  In  addition, the river board  gave technical advice 
to commercial farmers on water issues and the application of water rights. The River Boards 
were composed  of representatives from  the commercial  farming  sector.  private companies, 
manufacturing  and  mining  industries  and  the  Rural  District  Council,  in  effect  representing 
White commercial interests in  both agriculture and  industry. To  this extent, they provided an 
institutional route to gaining access to water for White commercial interests. 
The Case of Chipinge River Board 
River  Boards  remained  functional  in  water  management  up  to  1998,  when  the  Law 
establishing  the  Zimbabwe  National  Water  Authority  was  passed,  marking  a  new 
dispensation in  water management in  Zimbabwe. With' the advent of the Water Act of 1998, 
the Chipinge River Board came t9 be known as Budzi' Sub-Catchment Council. The functions 
of Budzi Sub-Catchment Council include, amon.g others: 
• 	 To regulate and supervise the exercis!:) of permits for the use of water including ground 
water within the area for which it wa-s established 
• 	 To  monitor  water  flows  and  water  use  in  accordance  with  allocations  made  under 
permits  _, 
• 	 To  ensure  that such water measuring devices as  may be  required to  enable the  Sub­
Catchment Council to discharge its functions are in place and operating 
• 	 To  promote  catchment  protection  in  accordance  with  the  Water (Catcllment Counc'/) 
Regulations of 2000. 
• 	 To ensure that anyone discharging waste w'?ter into the river has a permit 
• 	 To report as required to the Catchment Gouncil on exercise of water permits its area 
• 	 To assist in the collection of data and participate in pl<;Inning 
• 	 To collect sub-catchment rates, fees and,levies. 
In addition. the Act provided for the opening-up Of Budzl Sub- Catchment Council to all water 
users and stakeholders to_participafE:3'in the management oLwater in  Budzi catchment. This is 
also true for Lower Save Sub-Catchfneni Council. The extent to which Budzi and Lower .Save 
Sub~Catchment Councils have indeed  'openE?d  up  and  aJI  water user groups are effe_ctively·­
taking a role and participating in  the rn.anagement ofwater in the sUb-catchment' IS the focus 
of the next section. 
12 Representation of Water Users 
The  Sub-Catchment  Councils  consist  of elected  representatives  from  all  the  stakeholder 
groups. Both Budzi and  Lower Save Sub-Catchment Council have 15 representatives from all 
water  user  groups,  which  is  maximum  allowed  number.  However,  there  were  interested 
groups  that  were  invited  to  Budzi  SCC  namely,  AGRITEX,  Natural  Resources  Board  and 
Chipinge  and  Chimanimani  Rural  District Councils. With  regards  to  Lower Save,  of the  four 
Rural  District Councils covered by the sub-catchment, only Chipinge Rural  District Council is 
currently  represented.  These  various  and  diverse  stakeholders  elect a Chairperson  and  a 
Vice-Chairperson  who  coordinate  the  SCC  activities  and  also  represent  the  SCC  at  the 
Catchment level. 
Participation 
One  of the  key  elements  in  water sector reforms  in  Zimbabwe  is  to  ensure  paticipation of 
different water user  groups from  sub-catchment to  catchment level.  To  this  extent,  the  two 
Sub-Catchment  Councils  have  similar  approaches of ensuring participation,  Firstly,  the  two 
Sub- Catchment  Councils  established  the  position  of Outreach  Officer who  is  tasked  with 
informing  people  about  the  functions  of the  Sub-Catchment  Council.  Additional  roles  and 
responsibilities of the Outreach Officer include, inter alia; 
• 	 Taking water meter readings 
• 	 The collection of water levies from people 
• 	 Listing of all water sources in the catchment 
• 	 Ensuring that communities observed conservation practices 
• 	 Holding meetings with water user groups and informing them about the Sub-Catchment 
Council  However,  it is  important to note that for Budzi SCC, the Outreach' Officer was 
previously the Water Meter Reader, whose main job was the collection of water meter 
readings  and  the  distribution  of water bills  or receipts.  Thus the  need  to  include  an 
outreach  component  was  borne  out  of  the  need  to  make  different  water  users, 
particularly,  communal farmers, irrigators, and small-scale and newly resettled farmers 
- the  'new water users' - become aware of the Sub-Catchment Councils.  In  addition, 
the  outreach  programmes  were  meant'to involve  and  educate the  new water  users 
about their role  in  water management. When the Outreach Officer of Budzi SCC was 
asked about his main duties,: he stated,  ' 
My main duties are to  make sure that people pay their levies .,' I have a motorcycle 
that I use  to  move  around and give people their receipts.  I make sure  penple pay for 
water. 
What emerges from  the this comment is-'the SCC's pre-occupation with  making people pay 
for water rather  than  making  people  aware of the  broad  water sector reforms,  particularly, 
communal and small-scale farmers'  role  in  its management. This is  compounded by the fact 
that the outreach programme, as currently conceived by both Sub-Catchment C9uncils, is not 
aimed at educating the new stakeholders, mainly communal, small-scale and  newly resettled 
farmers about their roles  and  responsibilifies'within'the Sub-Catchment Council.  Rather, the 
outreach  programme IS  viewed  as  a vehicle  of 'justifying why the  new stakeholders should 
pay  for  water  and  not  as  an  education  ahd  consciousness-raising  programme  aimed  at 
making  water user  groups'  get jnvolved  ana  participate  effectively  in  the  managerilentof 
water. Despite the approach of the .,9utreach programme, there is no clear explanation -10-new_, 
stakeholders  as  to why  they ~are paying  for water and  what is  the  basis  of the  new water .. 
charges,  Added  to  this ~si!.uatiQn  ~fre-the_ practical difficulties  encouhtered  by .. one  ~Qutre,act1 
officer in  trying to cover all  ttlecwaterusers in  a sub-catchment, taking into aQcQunttllatthe 
sub-catchment areas  in  BUOzi  and :lower  -Save cover two and  four Rural  Districf Councils 
respectively,  As  one  respondelllhoted,  ione  outreach  or training  officer  is  noJ  er}oagn-to 
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13 reach  all  the  farmers  considering  the  sizes  of the  sub-catchment areas.  It will  take  some 
time.' With particular reference to  Lower Save sub-catchment, there  appears to  be  a lack of 
information about the general activities of the Sub-Catchment Council for farmers in irrigation 
schemes,  and  for small-scale and  communal  farmers.  This  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that 
most of the water found  in  Lower Save sub-catchment,  is  agreement water which is directly 
managed  by  ZINWA.  Thus,  farmers  directly  engage  with  ZINWA  rather  than  the  Sub­
Catchment Council. This is illustrated by the case of Chibuwe Irrigation Scheme: 
We  had problems with  the  supply of water from  Save River to  the  irrigation  scheme.  This 
was mainly due to  the fact that during Cyclone Eline the side of the river where  our engines 
are located had sand dunes,  thus water did not flow to  where the engines are.  As a result, 
there was no water being pumped into the canals and then to our fields.  Since the water we 
are using is dam  water,  over which ZINWA has direct control,  we  went directly to  the  local 
ZINWA office with our problems.  We  went to  ZINWA because we paid our money to ZINWA 
so that it will provide us with  water.  The agreement was that ZINWA will provide water to the 
field edge,  and that is  why we  went to  ZINWA  so  that it  will fulfil part of its agreement,  to 
provide  water  to  the  field  edge.  We  did not  go  to  Lower Save  Sub-Catchment  Council 
because  it  does  not deal with  agreement water.  ZINWA  is  the  one  we  are  dealing  with 
because we paid our water levies to ZINWA4. 
Further,  the  lack  of participation  of small-scale  farmers  in  Lower  Save  sub-catchment  is 
worsened  by the  fact  that  most of the  small-scale farmers undertaking irrigated  agriculture 
are under ARDA estates, which means that they pay water charges to  ARDA.  ARDA deals 
directly  deals  with  ZINWA  and  Sub-Catchment  Councils  and  not  the  small-scale  farmers 
under  its  jurisdiction.  The  ex-Chairperson  of  Lower  Save  Sub- Catchment  Council  ana 
Manager of ARDA Rusitu stated, 
ZINWA. charges a  blanket water charge  to ARDA  estates,  and ARDA  in  tum  charges the 




Institutional access to  water therefore depends on  the  type of water an  individual farmer is 
using.  For  river  water,  a  user goes  to  the:Sub-Catchment Council, "while  for  dam  water 
(known  in  catchment council  parlance  as  'agreemenf water'),  the  farmer goes  to  ZINWA. 
Given this institutional complexity,: people are riot aware of which institutions to  consult over 
their water  needs,  which  excludes  many  users' from  a participation  in  water management. 
This  was  clearly  put  forward  by  the  currerit  Chairperson  of  Lower  Save  Sub-Catchment 
Council: 
The  truth  is  that people in  Lower Save -sub-catchment do not know what is  going on  with 
regards to water reforms.  First,  they still consult their respective Rural District Councils about 
water  issues.  Secondly,  they  do  not  know  the  difference  [between]  ZINwA  and  Sub­
Catchment Councils, they think it's one and the same thing. 
6 
Even for those who are willing to pay for water, tbe institutional complexity discourages them, 
as  they are  referred  from  one institution to another, as  illustrated by one small-scale farmer 
from Nyanyadzi:  ' 
- These  things about: -warer .8rfJ now confusing.  I  wan tea to  take  water from  Nyarwaazi al1d 
start some  sort of irrigE!tiofl-ffl my. field.  I  asked people about the  process ofapplyfifg [or· 
water.  The majority at ff2e  p~op1e raskect w()re not clear about the process._ So,  tdec}deCl  to 
take a bus to Cfiimanimant-Rvral DistriCt Councfl, which is 120 km away.  (tbo[J~~t Since they 
- --- - ~~ 
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14 are the ones who  deal with our needs, I would do it there and finish at once.  When  I went to 
Chimanimani Rural District Council,  I was  told to go to  Lower Save Sub- Catchment Council 
offices in  Chipangayi.  I was  shocked because  I did not know about these  developments.  I 
was  also informed that Nyanyadzi falls  under Lower Save sub-catchment,  but for any other 
needs  besides  water,  I  should  continue  going  to  Chimanimani.  That  aside,  I  scheduled 
another visit  to  Chipangayi to  see  officials  of Lower Save  Sub-Catchment  Council.  I took 
another bus  from  Nyanyadzi to  Chipangayi,  which is  another 120 km.  When  I got to  Lower 
Save Sub-Catchment Council offices with  my concern,  I was  shocked again to  hear that the 
water I want to  abstract is  agreement water,  which  falls  directly under ZINWA  and not the 
Sub-Catchment  Council.  I  was  advised  to  go  to  Mutare,  which  is  another  120  km  from 
Nyanyadzi.  I decided when I get back home,  I am not going anywhere because I will also be 
referred to  another office,  120 km away.  I was paying bus fare  to  and from  all these places. 
Transport is expensive these days,  I cannot afford it.  I decided to get the water from the river 
and wait and see who will prosecute me
7
. 
From the corollary of the above case, the  new institutional complexity has an  adverse impact 
on  representation  and  participation. Much of this complexity is  compounded  by  the  different 
processes  of decentralisation.  Firstly,  the  Rural  District Councils were  created  during local 
government  decentralisation,  with  a  mandate  to  implement  and  oversee  local  level 
development  activities  in  all  areas  under their jurisdiction.  Secondly,  catchment  and  Sub­
Catchment Councils and  the  Zimbabwe  National  Water Authority and  its  local  level  offices 
are  decentralised  institutions created  specifically  for  water  management  in  a  given  local 
hydrological zone.  ZINWA was  to  provide  technical  assistance  to  the  catchment and Sub­
Catchment  Councils.  Further,  ZINWA  was  to  manage  dams  constructed  by  the  then 
Department  of  Water.  The  effect  of  these  different  decentralisation  processes,  with 
independent developmental objectives, was to create  an  institutionally complex environment 
for  new  stakeholders  who  wished  to  gain  access  to  water,  to  understand  and  position 
themselves to  effectively partfcipate  and  playa role  in  water management within  the Sub­
Catchment Council. 
In  a similar  vein,  the  establishment of Catchment and  Sub-Catchment  Councils  with their 
hydrological  boundaries  added  another' complexity  that  inhibits  participation  of  all 
stakeholders from  the  different corne.rs  of the sub-ca:tchment.  Hydrological boundaries were 
overlain across political and adniin'istrative boundaries. The decentralisation process created 
villages,  wards  and  Rural  District  Councils.  When  the  latter  were  formed,  Rural  District 
Councils became the  focal administrative points where stakeholders met and discussed their 
various district development issues. 
In  addition.  complaints and problems were  channelled to the  local  authority,  particularly by 
communal  people,  By  contrast,  the  decentralisation  process  surrounding  water  reforms 
shifted  the  focal  point  to  Catchment  and  Sub-Catchment  Council-under  the  IWRM 
paradigm.  Thus  people  who were  used  to  reporting  to  their  RDCs  were  instead  made  to 
report water issues to a Sub-Catchment Council. which mayor may not be in their 'district' or 
area, perhaps forcing pepple to travello'ngdistances to report water issues, seek information 
and  apply  for  permits.  This  difficulty  waS'  stated  by  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  of 
Chimanimani Rural District Council: 
People  ;;JIe not aware of where- to go with their water queries -;.: naturally most people come 
_to 1h'(;Rural District Council because it is their local authority..  :We~constantly tell people that 
_water issues iIJ--some parts of Chimanimani,  which  is from the  Sk}t/irre  Junction,town area, 
RUSitu J -Ndima and the surrounding areas report t6 BudziStJti  ..Catchmefil Council which is in 
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~	Cflipi~ df~tricL  The --other  parts.- Nyanyadzfand  Cm?.hef  ar!jas  ref5ort~ to  different  Sub­
CatChii]elJi COtIncils.-:You see, it's complicated.  8 
~ 	 ~ . 
Sil1}ilar-..::0bServations  were _made  by the  council  chairman~ofQ.r:Hpinge R-ural  DistricLCouncil 
wfl6 
cno@tl-::ihat  the~ hydrological  and  political  boundaries confusff people over institutional 
_resPQnsibilify  for· water  issues.  Some  parts  of  Chipinge  District  report  to  Budzi  Sub­
-Catchme-nt COuncil while the  part that is in the lowveld report to~l:6wer"Save Sub-Catchment 
. COl.JA1:il.  FLfI:tl:lqrrthe.small-scale farmer in  Nyanyadzi iQdica.tea  tne~fiR:imdal costs  that are 
involvea  iirtfyiagJo gain  access  to  the  decentralisedWater irihlitl.J1iohs.. Thus;· the  cost  of 
- ~tr8\;ler"may  inhibit ..a  lof of  communal  and  small-scale  farmers· to  p-articipate  .in  water 
li1ai1agsm~ent.indrtectly limiting participation to rich people wh6  can-afford the transport costs. 
. 	 . 
Traditional leaders, and representatives of communal and small-scale farmers on  Budzi Sub­
Catchment Council also echoed the problem of transport. Their mai concern was the fact that 
the  transport allowance that they receive  from. toe Sub-CatchmentCbuncil is  inadequate to 
cater-for their travel to attend meetings. What emerges from the case below is a reiteration of 
the  limits to  representation and  participation  due  to  prohibitive transport costs.  The  issue of 
travel  and  subsistence  allowances  was  raised  at  both  Catchment  and  SUb-Catchment 
~ 	 Council  meetings.  Initially  there  were  no  transport  and  subsistence  allowances  paid  to 
representatives  of  water  users.  When  the  representatives  were  given  transport  and 
subsistence allowances of Z$500, the money was not-enough to cover a return trip for people 
who~were staying far  from  Chipinge town.  The representatrves that were  mainly affected by 
inadequate' travel. and  subsistence  allowances  were  those  from  Chimanimani  and  Rusitu, 
particularly  representatives  of traditional  leaders,  small-scale  and  commefctal  farmers  and 
the  Chimanimani  Rliral  District  Council.  The. attendance of these  stakeholders  has  been 
erratic and they unanimously argued that the travel allowances are iriadequate and  thus are 
unable to add  their own  savings to their cost of travelling. While the cost of attendance has 
limited· participation of some members, 'it is stiptllated that a representative who fails to attend 
three meetings will  be  dismissed from  council.  Based on  the  stipulation,  the  two  traditional 
leaders and  a representative of commercial  farmers from  Chimanimani,were recommended 
to  leave  based  on  the  fact  that  they  missed  more  than  three  meetings.  While  the 
representative  of commercial  farmers  subsequently  left  the  Budzi  Sub-Catchment  Council. 
the two traditional leaders are still on the Budzi Sub-Catchment Council. One official of Budzi 
Sub-CatchmeAt Council  explained  the  failure of dismissing them  was  on  the  basis  that 'the 
two  Chiefs  had  raised  valid  concerns  about  transport  costs  and  had  to  be  dealt  with 
differently:9 
However.  an  ex- representative  of Chimanimani  ROC  on  Budzi  SUb-Catchment  Council 
noted,  the  chairperson  considered  the  effect  of  expelling  the  two  traditional  leaders. 
Politically,  this  is  not the  right time  to  do such  things,  it  may have  been  interpreted  as  an 
affront to the ruling party who are closely aligned to traditional leaders. Secondly, the people 
under Chief Ndima  and  Headman  Dzingire  were  not going to participate  in  any  Budzi sub­
catchment  activities.  Traditional  leaders  are  still  very powerful  in  this  area.  It was  going  to 
give Budzi Sub-Catchment Council a lot of problems. 
Whilst physical  attendance  is  one  aspect  of participation,  there  is  a need  to  move  beyond 
physical  presence.  There is  a need to analyse the actual discussion of water issues among 
the  water  user groups  in  articulating  respective  groups'  interests.  The  extent  to  which  the 
'new  water  user  groups'  mainly  communal  farmers,  small-scale  farmers  and  resettled 
farmers  are  articulating  their  interests  is  debatable.  This  is  largely  because  the  new 
entrants do not have adequate information about the water reform,  are not well organised as 
interest  groups,  lack  the  experience  in  debating  and  articulating  water  issues,  and  are 
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16 incapacitated  by  thelaDfjlJage-tI§ed4fl  cgnducting  Sub-Catchment  Council  busines.s.  Tae 
information that is disserninat~to commynal, small-scale and newly resettled farmers by Die  . 
Sub-Catchment  Council  cO[lsists  largely  of justifications  for  paying  for  water.  There  is- no· 
information  about  the-brQad  water reforms,  particularly  issues  relating  to  people's role  in 
water management, issues-Of partiei~.?tion and.repr.esentation, or making .the  Sub~CatchmenL 
CounCil  downwardJr  aCG..ountable~ 6n the  contrary.  White  commercial  farmers  and  private 
companies are well versedjn the water reforms to the  extent that some commercial farm.ers 
carry the  1998 WaterAcL IO  Sub;;Catchment  Council  meetings  and  constantly referloit In  ­
their  debates.  This  was also  evidErClced  in -inferviews  with  White  commercial  farrTlers  and­
representatives of private~cempanies. In--additfon,some of them,  'particularly n.ewlyresettled 
farmers are completely new fof<!r!Iling and do not know the importance of water.' thiscm~akes . 
the  new entrants arrunCoordinated group and  renders  their representation and  participation·­
an  individual  enterprise.  Further: communal.  resettled,  and  small-scare  farme-rs  are  not 
organised  sufficiently  to  represent  their  interests  and  shape  the  debate  in  Bucfzi  Sub­
Catchment Council. The evidence t'lat Budz Spb-Catchment Council still focuses much of its 
debate  on  conservation  and- stream  baok  cultivaijon,  as  was  previously  the  case,  may 
indicate  the  interests  of one  group  of  water  users,  the  commercial  farmers.  The  local 
Zimbabwe  Farmers'  Union  representative  sta'ted,  'when  commercial  farmers  knew  that  the 
policy was changing, they quickly grabbed the process because they knew the importance of 
water. They were also better organised than other farmers.' 
The  use  of English  in  meetings  limIts  the  participation  of many  communal,  resettled  and 
small-scale  farmers.  Some  of the  key  informants  suggest~d that the Water Act,  the  ZINWA 
Act,  and  associated  literature  on  water  referms  should  be  written  in  local  languages.  This 
process  would greatly  contribute  to  the  understanding  of water  reforms  and  the  effective 
participation of communal, small-scale and r.esettled farmers. 
Commenting  on  how  the  White  Commercial  farmers'  speak  during  meetings,  one 
representative  noted.  that.  'these  White  farmers  speak  through  the  nose.  You  don't 
understand what they say: It is difficult.'1o  . 
Conclusions 
There  are  important crosscutting  narratives inVOlved  in  accessing water in  Zimbabwe under 
the new Water Act These narratives· reflect both thecurrent political environment and intrinsic 
changes  to  access rqles,  particularly surrounding  the  shift from  rights to  p~rmits as  a basis 
for apportionment of water.·  . 
Access  to  the  resource  is  still  defined  legally  through  the  issuing  of a  permit  (with  the 
approval  of the  Catchment  Council).  There  arehowever,  significant  financial  changes  to 
water access bought about by the new tariff system.  This institutes a system of payment and 
collection at the sub-catchment level (as in the case of Budzl) for water use over and  above a 
basic water requirement, which  remains free.  There are significant rights issues surrounding 
the different conceptions of the resource and entitlement to access, based not on water rights 
per se,but on  rights to  participate.  and  institutional  barriers to  the exercise  of these  rights, 
Whilst these barriers have provoked a'concerted popular challenge to the new Water Act,  at 
a local  level, they represent strong counter harratives that may make collection of payments 
difficult in  the  long term  and,  with poor revenue streams,  increasingly un-viable institutions. 
Although presently small-scale farmers' [laYITlents make up  only a relatively small proportiol1 
of total fees collected, in the future. changes to land tenure and occupation in Zimbabwe will 
challenge  the  new  institutions  of management  to  address  these  'small-scale'  narratives, 
particul"!rly  if they  are  reinfo!ced -bJ'  wider'Sotial  and  economic  political  narratives.  The 
sJructure  of management is supposed lei be  self~supporting based on  revenue streams from  ­
water tariffs. Whilst the Save CatchmenT remains SJJpp.orted-by an external donor, in thelong-
Jerm its viability will be based on obfajninga-raflge -offunds, from large bulk revenues paid by 
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major commercial  users,  to  collection  of  far  more  dispersed, small-scale  revenues  across a 
far  wider  geographical  area.  This  in  itself  will  have  significant  consequences  for  the 
institutional functioning of SCCs at a local level. One  possible direction that might be  followed 
is  to  institute Water Users Associations at a local level in  order to  help organise the  revenue 
collection  process  more  effectively  and  to  channel  information  from  above  and  demands, 
queries,  and  grievances  from  below.  Presently,  participation  at  a  sub-catchment  level  is 
determined  by  the  type  of users  based  in  that sub-catchment area.  This  arrangement both 
affects  the  capacity  of the  sub-catchment  to  carry out  tasks  (such  as  revenue  raising,  etc) 
and  the  overall  final  composition  of  the  catchment  council.  In  predominantly  commercial 
areas  (where  previously  River  Boards  were  more  active) the  commercial  and  White  sector 
will predominate. Giventheir greater technical knowledge derived from the earlier River Board 
era,  and  their overall  capacity to  attend  meetings,  greater coherence  in  managing  at  a sub­
catchment  level  might  be  expected.  This  also,  in  part,  defines the  final  composition  of  the 
Sub-Catchment  Councils  and,  in  the  long-term,  the  major  input  into  wider  catchment 
management processes. The  role  of Rur21  District Councils on  the  Sub-Catchment Councils 
will be  important in the future-more generally reflecting the occasional dissonance between 
decentralisations  based  on  parallel  administration  versus  resources.  At  present the  role  of 
ROCs  is slight on  the SCCs.  Nevertheless, they are the principal development agents at the 
local  level,  with  cross-cutting  committees  and  council  meetings  that have  majorbearing  on 
decisions  important  to  water  management,  including  responsibility  for  enf{)rcing  local 
regulations  on  land-use.  The  view of some  council  members is  that the  ZINWA  system  is 
extracting  revenues  from  Rural  Districts  without  any investment returning  to  that district,  in 
classic top-down fashion. Whilst at present the  Catchment Councils can claim that they are at 
the stage of formation, in the  near future the  'water tax' as it appears to some, may generate 
greater  interest  and  involvement  from  both  councillors  and  the  ROCs.  There  will  be 
increasing clamour for evidence of development spending as well  as revenue-raisrng for the 
purposes of institution-building. One of the  key areas of responsibility in  which the ROCs will 
almost  inevitably  have  a  long-term  role  is  in  enforcing  payments  where  smallscale 
commercial  and  communal  farmers  are  unwilling  to  pay  tariffs  and  where  'new  lands' 
encroach on 'environmentally sensitive' areas.  It is possible that the ROCs - through the ZFU 
and  the role of councillors - may even become a forum for competing narratives on  access to 
water, with the  restated 'environmental  cons~'rv,Hion' narratives being couhtered by land and 
water  access  narratives.  The  em.e~~fn.gcatchmerit council  process  in  Zimbabwe  therefore 
presents a fascinating insight into the  links  between  policy discourse on  water management 
processes on  the  one  ~an.d, and  the  local  narratives  on  access to natural capital,  including 
land,  water,  and  wildlife.  It  also presents a case  where  resource ownership relations are  in 
flux  Whilst a  key  resource  - water - is  increasingly  commodified and  represented  as  an 
ec-onomic good, despite many competing local-level narratives on whatconstitutes ownership 
and  how the resources  itself is  intrinsically' valued.  The  picture  emerging  suggests  that  an 
'integrated'  water  resource  management  paradigm,  is  a  complex  and  contested  concept 
when  applied  locally  within  diverse  user-base  environments~ Resource  governance  issues 
may  be  bound  up  closely with  e)(isting  and  new  narratives  on  water and  access  to other 
forms  of natural capital as  well as with past political and  economic legacies, the  influence of 
which  is found  in  contemporary policy  direc'tions~Removing the_ 's8-.Qmented  approaches' of 
past water management models,  and  trying 16 bring broader concepts of management and 
gover!lance  to  the  fore,  in  fact  instils  greater  deciSion  maki!'1g  complexity  on  a  broader 
(though  possibly less technically adept) set ofman-agers than  in  the past. The  clear need  fs 
-~  for  far- greater  support  to  the  institutional~rlVironmenL 'and -the -knowledge::based -and  ­
- Jun(~Honal strength of participation in these newlnstitutions._ -­
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